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This paper argues that the impact of devolution has been largely misperceived in
both liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) accounts
of European Union (EU) politics. To address the shortcomings of both LI and MLG,
a new data set measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU
policy-shaping process in the EU-27 is presented. Analysis shows that the relationship
between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is overall positive but
non-linear, with a strong threshold effect that is best captured by a quadratic function.
The causal nature of the link between devolution and institutionalized regional
involvement is ascertained through qualitative means using process tracing and Mill’s
method of difference. The article concludes with the necessary updating of MLG
and LI frameworks to account for the impact of devolution on EU policy-shaping.
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Introduction
This article seeks to correct two widespread misperceptions concerning devolution in
European Union (EU) research. Various aspects of devolution – understood as the
transfer of competences from the state to an intermediate form of territorial self-
government (Keating, 2009: 424) – have been under the academic microscope for
some time. Until now, however, research dealing with the combined themes of
devolution and EU politics has largely failed to correct for two thick-skinned falla-
cies. The first is the idea that greater devolution of powers from the state to its regions
will increase conflict and bypassing on the European scene. The second is a lacuna,
rather than a fallacy stricto sensu, which overlooks the formal status of regions as
influential (and even sometimes veto) players in the internal EU policy-shaping
process of some member states. These two shortcomings in the EU politics literature
have led to biased predictions about the impact of devolution. While much of the
multi-level governance (MLG) literature has predicted greater autonomy from,
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and bypassing of, central governments by highly devolved regions, literature inspired
by a liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) reading of EU politics has overlooked the
institutional weight of regions in the domestic preference formation phase, and hence
underplayed the importance of this very special type of non-state actor.
With a view to addressing these enduring misperceptions, this paper starts
by briefly highlighting their origins and consequences. It then introduces a new
data set measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU
policy-shaping process in 304 regions and assesses its relationship with regional
authority (as a proxy for devolution levels). It argues that a quadratic function
best captures such a relationship and then qualitatively ascertains the robustness
of its causal nature. Accepting the hypothesis that greater devolution increases
institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process
explains why greater devolution leads to less bypassing and more state-region
cooperation on the European scene (contrary to some MLG predictions) and why
LI analytical frameworks will remain misleading about the role and influence of
regions in the EU until they accommodate the formal leverage that they have,
throughout the EU policy process, in member states such as Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom but also – albeit to a lesser degree –
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, or Portugal. This research thereby helps to
bridge the gap between MLG and LI approaches to the question of the impact of
devolution on regional involvement in the EU policy-shaping process.
Overlooked and misunderstood: the impact of devolution on regions
and their member states in the EU
Much of both the MLG and the LI literatures have misperceived the impact of
devolution on regions and their member states in the EU. Unfortunately, the
literature using an LI framework generally overlooks the formal role of regions.
This is inconsistent with the LI analytical framework which gives much impor-
tance to the ‘pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political
institutions’ in LI’s first phase, that of ‘domestic preference formation’, which
conditions the ‘configuration of state preferences’ and hence the interests states
will defend during the second phase of ‘interstate bargaining’ (Moravcsik, 1993:
482). Taking stock of devolution levels, and hence of the domestic power of
regions, is therefore highly compatible with LI. Indeed, Moravcsik has unam-
biguously and repeatedly underlined the significance of the internal process of
negotiation between state and non-state actors, which determines and constrains
the nature of the preferences pursued by the member state on the European scene.
In a 1993 article and elsewhere before and after that (Moravcsik, 1991, 1992,
1995; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009), he specified that:
The foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in
response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are
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aggregated through political institutions. National interests are, therefore,
neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge through domestic political con-
flict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational
coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognised by governments. An
understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the
analysis of the strategic interaction among states (Moravcsik, 1993: 481).
Moreover, in a later passage, Moravcsik underlines that a societal group’s
influence on the domestic process will covary with how much it stands to gain or
lose from European integration and its associated policies (Moravcsik, 1993:
483). Although mainly intended to accommodate for various types of (mostly
economic) stakeholders and interest groups, the LI framework clearly allows
for regions to be a prominent element of the right-hand side of the ‘domestic
preference formation’ equation. Strictly speaking, regions can be conceived as
domestic non-state actors that have some leverage in the national institutional and
political set-up through a battery of formal and informal means. These range from
the more institutionalized and constraining, such as in the case of the German
La¨nder and the so-called Politikverflechtung (Scharpf, 1988, 2006; Moore and
Eppler, 2008), to the more diffuse and informal, such as in unitary and centralized
states (Le Gale`s and Lequesne, 1998; Ne´grier and Jouve, 1998). In twenty-first
century Europe, most regions generally ‘stand to gain and lose a great deal
per capita’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 483) as the functions and competences devolved to
them increasingly overlap with those delegated to the EU (Jeffery, 1997a; Bourne,
2003, 2004; Fleurke and Willemse, 2006; Tatham, 2007b). Logically, an LI frame-
work should predict that, depending on the level of devolution, regions can be
among the most influential players during the ‘domestic preference formation’ phase
and hence a non-trivial player in EU politics. The argument has indeed already been
made some time ago that ‘strong regions have both more to gain by trying to
influence EU policy and more to lose if they do not’ (Marks et al., 2002: 9).
The counter-intuitive omission of regions as relevant players in the original LI
framework can partially be explained by the fact that, initially, few member states
had high levels of devolution. Of the original six, Germany1 was the only fully
federal member state, while devolution levels were still low in Belgium, France,
or Italy. However, various waves of devolution throughout Europe (such as in
Belgium, France, Italy, the UK, Poland, Hungary, or Romania), as well as the accession
of highly devolved member states (e.g. Austria, Spain) have increased the mass, power,
and hence relevance of the regional level in domestic and EU politics. In this light,
LI has surprisingly overlooked the EU’s regions despite its analytical framework
1 In The Choice for Europe (Moravcsik, 1998) the roles of the Bundesrat and German La¨nder are
(fleetingly) mentioned on pp. 391, 399, 402–403, and 455 when dealing with questions related to the
creation of the Committee of the Regions, the subsidiarity clause in the Maastricht Treaty, or the German
Federal government’s motives for the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting. Unless mistaken, the role
of the German La¨nder or that of any other regions is otherwise hardly mentioned.
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being highly compatible with the factoring of regions into its first stage of national
preference formation.
Though it has certainly not overlooked the impact of devolution on regions
and their member states in the EU, much of the MLG literature has misperceived
its consequences. The topic of the interaction between regionalization and EU
integration is not new and these last three decades have been characterized by an
abundance of research on several of its aspects (for an overview see, among others,
Keating, 1998, 2008a, b, 2009). Within this literature, a narrower corpus of work
has focused on identifying the main determinants of regional involvement in the EU
policy process. Even if quite diversified, this research has made significant claims
about the impact of devolution on various aspects of regional involvement. Though
the level of devolution is often presented as only one important determinant among
others, its recurrence as a significant explanatory factor is testimony to the fact that
such a variable plays a non-negligible, non-random role. Looking at structural
policy, a number of authors emphasize the importance of devolution levels in
determining the activeness and autonomy of regions (Pollack, 1995: 377; Bache
et al., 1996: 319; Bache and Bristow, 2003: 424). Similarly, some studies on
regional mobilization at the EU level have argued that the higher the devolution
level, the greater and more efficient the mobilization by regional actors in Brussels
(Marks et al., 1996: 183; Hocking, 1997: 105; Nielsen and Salk, 1998: 247;
Jeffery, 2000: 12–13; Marks et al., 2002: 9; Sykes and Shaw, 2008: 69; Tatham,
2008: 504, 507).
Although these findings are undeniably robust, they have led to the misleading
expectation that greater devolution increases bypassing of, and conflict with,
central government abroad – and in Brussels more particularly – as the consequent
loss by central government of its gatekeeping role would illustrate (Pollack, 1995:
377; Bache et al., 1996: 319; Keating and Hooghe, 2006: 281). In a nutshell,
devolution would increase regional mobilization, which would in turn erode the
gatekeeping position of the member state thereby circumvented on the EU scene
(Goldsmith, 1993: 698; Marks et al., 1996: 170; Ward and Williams, 1997: 445).
In addition, it has often been assumed that, as greater devolution generates greater
tensions between the centre and its periphery domestically, these tensions would
then translate into greater conflict on the Brussels scene. Recent qualitative and
quantitative research, however, has argued that, contrary to expectations, higher
devolution levels lead to greater cooperation with, and less bypassing of, the
member state. One theoretical explanation for this counter-intuitive relationship
is that devolution increases the level of inclusion of regions in the domestic EU
policy-shaping process (Jeffery, 2007a: 14; Tatham, 2007a: 24, 2010: 83).
Unfortunately, the link between devolution and regional involvement in the
domestic EU policy-shaping process has never been fully and systematically
investigated. There are obvious reasons for this research gap. Measures of
devolution have always been highly contested and often unconvincing while no
systematic measure of regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping
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process exists. On the first point, the measure proposed by Hooghe et al. (2008) is
by far the most convincing of its kind. One can criticize it and point to some
limitations. However, the regional authority index (RAI) is, without doubt, the
best indicator available.
On the second point, there are no cross-sectional indicators available. Some
authors have offered insightful studies of national EU coordination systems but
have not particularly focused on regions while their work usually predates the last
two enlargement waves (Kassim et al., 2000; Kassim et al., 2001). Other authors
do mention lists of factors when detailing intra-state channels of regional interest
representation (Hooghe, 1995, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Jeffery, 1997a,
2000; Keating and Hooghe, 2006; Tatham, 2007b). Charlie Jeffery, however, goes
furthest and breaks down ‘central-regional coordination on EU policy’ into six
distinct dummy variables and classifies five highly devolved member states
accordingly (Jeffery, 2007a: 7).
Building on Jeffery’s and others’ works, the following section discusses the different
dimensions and limitations of a parsimonious indicator of institutionalized regional
involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process. The section after that
explores its relationship to devolution (as measured by Hooghe et al.’s RAI indicator)
and discovers that a quadratic function best captures the non-linear but overall
positive relationship. This finding illustrates how the disregard for regions in LI
analyses of EU politics constitutes a non-trivial omission and sheds some light on the
otherwise counter-intuitive impact of devolution on state-region relations in Brussels
that much of the MLG literature had largely failed to predict or account for.
Measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic
EU policy-shaping process
This section details the rationale behind the selection and coding of the dimen-
sions included in the operationalization of the institutionalized regional involve-
ment indicator. It also underlines the inherent limits of the aggregate indicator.
Dimensions and rationale
Like all latent variables, the concept of ‘regional involvement in the domestic
EU policy-shaping process’ is a construct which is both multi-dimensional and,
ultimately, incommensurable. Indeed, many determinants of such involvement are
either difficult to measure or stochastic (personal relationships and chemistries,
entrepreneurship, know-how, social and political capital, networking, etc.).
However, I argue that these elements only introduce some variation from a ‘baseline’
level of involvement, which can be best captured by focusing on institutionalized
involvement.
To facilitate analysis, the policy process has been divided into two phases: the
legislative and pre-legislative phase, on the one hand, and the post-legislative
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phase once legislation has been passed and requires implementation, on the other.
The first phase has been further unpacked to extract five dimensions. The second
has been broken down into three dimensions. The combined indicator hence
comprises eight elements.
By its very nature, this indicator captures institutionalized involvement only
in policy areas where regions are competent. This implies that the aggregate
indicator is applicable only to these policy areas.2 These policy areas vary across
regions, with some regions having greater competences over a wider array of
policy areas and others having very few competences in still fewer policy areas.
Such cross-sectoral and cross-sectional variation is – by default – captured by the
aggregate score (as an indicator of the institutionalized involvement of regions in
policy areas where they are legally competent). I outline the dimensions of each
phase, starting with the legislative and pre-legislative phase, below.
The first dimension evaluates whether regions have any participatory rights in
the domestic EU policy-shaping process. A distinction is made between three
situations. First, when there are no special mechanisms in place; second, when
these are only guaranteed through soft, non-binding law; and third, when they are
legally or constitutionally guaranteed. The UK devolved governments are the only
cases that fall in the second category.3 Countries falling into the third category
include not only highly devolved systems such as Austria, Germany, Belgium,
Spain, or Italy, but also islands benefiting from special arrangements, such as
A˚land or Madeira and the Azores, and countries which have a strong consultative
tradition, such as Denmark, Finland, or the Netherlands (Mannozzi, 2005a:
227–228; Ronchetti, 2005a: 130, 2005b: 140; Ronchetti and Santantonio, 2005:
48; Sciumbata, 2005b: 215–216). Concerning this third category, the decision was
taken to conflate constitutional and legal guarantees as it is expected that whether
the participation rights are constitutionally protected or simply legally guaranteed
will not drastically alter the level of regional involvement. For example, though
the Spanish Autonomous Communities’ participation right is not constitutionally
enshrined, it is still protected by a corpus of laws and constitutional court rulings
and its constitutional enshrinement would not make a notable difference in the
level of involvement (Aldecoa and Cornago, 2009: 263; Keating, 2009: 433).
The second dimension evaluates whether there is a special procedure for regions
to express their position on EU issues (where their competences overlap) and
when this is the case, whether such a position can be binding or whether it can
only ever be non-binding, as is the case for the UK devolved governments, the
Dutch Provinces, and the Azores and Madeira islands (Mannozzi, 2005a: 219;
Sciumbata, 2005b: 216). The rationale behind the choice of looking at whether
regions have the possibility to express a binding position, as opposed to whether
2 Usually, regions are less active in policy areas where they have no or few competences.
3 See the memorandums of understanding and concordats on coordination of European Union policy
issues.
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they actually use this option frequently,4 lies in the argument that the possibility of
expressing a binding position on the member state can be a credible threat by
regions to have their interests included – even when they do not have a binding
right in the policy area concerned or do not usually use it.
The third dimension is a simple dichotomous measure of whether regional
representatives can have access to Council negotiations through the use of
Maastricht’s article 203. The literature is still divided on the usefulness of such a
provision for regions to represent their EU interests or coerce their member state
into supporting them. However, it has been argued that such a tool can allow
regions to represent distinctive interests at a crucial stage in the EU policy process
(Tatham, 2008: 499–502). The usual suspects comprise the German and Austrian
La¨nder, the Belgian regions, the Italian regions and autonomous provinces of
Trento and Bolzano, the Spanish Autonomous Communities, and the UK
devolved governments (Mannozzi, 2005b: 236; Ferrara, 2005a: 102, 2005b: 162,
169; Keating and Hooghe, 2006: 274; European University Institute, 2008: 185,
286; Aldecoa and Cornago, 2009: 255).
The fourth dimension deals with sub-state participation in Commission and Council
working groups. More precisely, it assesses whether there are any mechanisms in place
to guarantee such participation (or, at the very least, attendance), and when this is
the case, whether provisions are made through soft law or legally/constitutionally
guaranteed. The merger of the legal and constitutional guarantees follows the
same logic as that of the first dimension. The only case where this provision is
made through soft law is that of the Spanish Autonomous Communities (Mannozzi,
2005b: 240; Aldecoa and Cornago, 2009: 254–255) while the UK devolved govern-
ments are considered as having a legally guaranteed right of access as a consequence of
the unified nature of her Majesty’s civil service.5 The Province of A˚land also stands out
because of its legally guaranteed participation in Finland’s permanent representation
(PR) and hence access to the working groups (Ronchetti, 2005b: 139).
The fifth dimension details whether Brussels office staff benefit from diplomatic
accreditation completely, partially, or not at all. As suggested elsewhere (Tatham,
2008: 507), diplomatic accreditation grants member state-like rights (and duties)
to officials of regional offices, thus granting them an access to the Commission
and the Council equal to that enjoyed by their member state colleagues. Three
categories are identified: accreditation, partial accreditation, and no accreditation
4 The decision to code the Spanish Autonomous Communities as being able to express a binding
opinion on the Spanish government stems from the fact that, within Sectoral Conferences, agreements
reached and signed by the Spanish government and by each of the Autonomous Communities ‘are binding
on both parties’ while the general principle of cooperation between the State and the Autonomous
Communities has been repeatedly recognized in constitutional case law (on both points, see Mannozzi,
2005b: 245). The possibility of binding agreements and the recognition by constitutional case law of the
principle of cooperation justify such coding despite the fact that many Autonomous Community positions
in EU-related intergovernmental decision-making remain non-binding (Keating and Wilson, 2009: 553).
5 Concerning the Northern Ireland Civil Service, see Parry (2004).
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at all. Only Belgian sub-state entities and the UK devolved governments have full
diplomatic accreditation. Partial accreditation means that the staff in the regional
Brussels office do not have accreditation but that the region either has some staff
specifically representing it in the state’s PR (hence with diplomatic accreditation)
or a collective representative for all regions in the PR (hence with diplomatic
accreditation). Austrian and German La¨nder have a representative in their
member state PR in the form of a La¨nderbeobachter for the latter and a joint
La¨nder/VST representative for the former. The Italian regions and autonomous
provinces of Trento and Bolzano have four regional officials nominated to the
PR by the State-region conference (Mabellini, 2005b: 201) while the Spanish
Autonomous Communities have, since 1996, created the post of Counsellor for
Autonomous Affairs as an integral part of the PR while the December agreement
of 2004 increased this presence with two extra officials from the Autonomous
Communities themselves (Mannozzi, 2005b: 239–240; Aldecoa and Cornago,
2009: 255). Although the coding is the same, the situation is different for the
islands of A˚land, Madeira, and the Azores, each of which has an official repre-
senting its specific interests within the member state PR (Mannozzi, 2005a: 220;
Ronchetti, 2005b: 139).
The sixth, seventh, and eighth dimensions deal with the post-legislative phase,
that is, that of implementation. The sixth dimension details whether there are
provisions for regions to request their member state to appeal to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) against EU decisions through the annulment procedure
spelt out in article 230 of the EC Treaty. More precisely, the variable describes
whether such a right for regions to request their member state to bring pro-
ceedings before the ECJ when legislation impinges on their competences exists or
not, and when such a mechanism exists, whether the regional request can ever be
binding or not, following the logic outlined for the second dimension. Only
Austrian and German La¨nder and the Belgian and Italian sub-state entities can
formulate binding requests on their state, while they are non-binding in the case
of the Spanish Autonomous Communities (Ferrara, 2005c: 88–89; Mabellini,
2005b: 206–207, 2005d: 293–294; Kiefer, 2009: 72).
The seventh dimension evaluates whether regions participate or not in the
domestic process of implementing EU legislation. A simple dichotomous distinction
is here made between cases where there is or is not a special mechanism in place to
achieve such a task. Only the Austrian and German La¨nder, the Belgian and Danish
regions, the Italian regions and autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, the
UK devolved governments and the islands of A˚land, Azores, and Madeira fall into
the former category (Mabellini, 2005a: 70–71, 2005b: 202–204; Mannozzi, 2005a:
226, 229; Ronchetti, 2005a: 131, 2005b: 142–143; Sciumbata, 2005a: 119).
The eighth and last dimension distinguishes cases where there is a special
mechanism, or not, by which regions would have to pay financial penalties for
member state non-compliance with EU obligations where they would be identified
as responsible. Such procedures are in place in Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
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Italy,6 and for the UK devolved governments (Ronchetti, 2005a: 132; Mabellini,
2005c: 77; European University Institute, 2008: 319; Raccah, 2008: 271; Hrbek,
2009: 156). Table 1 details how each individual dimension was numerically
coded.
The legislative and pre-legislative measure is an additive index of the first five
dimensions, while the post-legislative measure is an additive index of the last three
dimensions. The overall involvement score is a sum of these two additive indexes.
A decision was taken to scale all variables between zero and one so that they should
all have an equal weight in the aggregate score as they all represent different
Table 1. Coding scheme: measurement of institutionalized regional involvement
in the domestic EU policy-shaping process
Legislative and pre-legislative phase
1. Participation right of regions in the domestic EU policy-shaping process
05No special mechanism in place
0.55Guaranteed through soft law
15Constitutionally/legally guaranteed
2. Region’s position on EU affairs
05No special mechanism in place
0.55Non-binding only
15Binding on member state in some instances
3. Use of article 203 (Maastricht) for regional participation in Council of ministers meetings
05Not possible
15 Possible
4. Commission and Council working group participation
05No special mechanism in place
0.55Guaranteed through soft law
15Constitutionally/legally guaranteed
5. Diplomatic accreditation of regional Brussels staff
05No
0.55Partly
15Yes
Post-legislative phase
6. Region can request its member state to appeal to the European Court of Justice against EU decisions
05No special mechanism in place
0.55Non-binding request only
15Binding on member state in some instances
7. Participation of the region in the domestic implementation of EU legislation
05No special mechanism in place
15Yes
8. Region has to pay financial penalties for non-compliance with EU obligations
05No special mechanism in place
15Yes
EU5European Union.
6 Since 2007 and the legge Finanziaria 2007 which embedded the azione di rivalsa and the principle of
chi sbaglia paga.
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dimensions of the same concept. There were no theoretical reasons to weigh these
variables in any particular way. Since the literature does not offer systematic evidence
of the relative importance of each dimension vis-a`-vis each other, the default option
of adding them unweighted but standardized was implemented.
Limits
Like any measure of a latent variable, this indicator has its limits. Two types of
limits can be identified and need to be acknowledged before proceeding any
further. The first type of limit has to do with some involvement mechanisms,
which have been overlooked for the sake of parsimony or because of a lack of
robust theoretical and empirical evidence justifying their inclusion. First, domestic
participation in ministerial meetings might make a substantial difference in
terms of regional access and influence. Such participation takes place in countries
such as Austria or the UK, but not in others such as Germany. This mechanism,
however, correlates highly with the first dimension (participation right) without
representing a theoretically distinct dimension. Though not irrelevant, it was
sacrificed in the name of parsimony and simplicity. Second, the bilateral or
multilateral nature of domestic intergovernmental relations was ignored. Indeed,
one could assume that there might be better access and hence higher involvement
when there are only three devolved governments as in the United Kingdom, as
opposed to 17 Autonomous Communities in Spain or 16 La¨nder in Germany.
However, it is not obvious that a higher number of powerful regions might not
lead to more efficient involvement: a coalition of a dozen La¨nder may be more
difficult to ignore, and hence marginalize, than a couple of devolved governments.
Since there has been little theoretical and empirical consensus on the effect of
bi- and multilateralism on the level of involvement of regions concerning EU
affairs, this variable was also excluded.
Similarly, other features were not included in the index because of a lack of
strong theoretical grounds or significant added value compared to existing indi-
cators. For example:
> if the member state has to abstain (from taking a position at the EU level) in cases
of lack of agreement between itself and its regions or between the regions
themselves, as is the case in Austria for the former and Belgium for both the
former and the latter;
> if regional ministers can chair or lead the member state delegation in the Council
of Ministers, as is the case for the United Kingdom, Belgium, or Germany, but
not Austria;
> the modalities under which the central government can implement EU legislation in
substitution of regions in case of implementation failure. Sometimes, this is only
possible after an ECJ ruling as a necessary precondition as in Austria or Belgium,
after a national court breach of Community law notification as in Germany, or
through pre-emptive, substitutive action by the central government until the regions
have themselves acted as in Portugal, Italy, and Spain (Mabellini, 2005d: 293);
62 M I C H A E¨ L TAT H A M
> whether there are institutionalized organs for conflict arbitration. These can take the
form of arbitration through constitutional courts, conciliatory committees (such as
the Belgian ‘Concertation Committee’ or the German conciliation procedure when
there is disagreement between the Bundesrat and the federal government), or strictly
political arbitration, for example, by the office of the head of government.
Ultimately, the objective of the institutionalized involvement measure is to
simplify the uniqueness of each domestic system in comparative perspective and
hence it does not capture all variation. Inevitably, countries with differing systems
and slightly different involvement mechanisms will have similar or identical
scores. A constructed indicator seeking to operationalize an abstract concept such
as institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping
process necessarily clusters cases together, which, despite not being strictly iden-
tical, are, comparatively to all other cases, most similar.
The second type of limit recognizes the fact that merely focusing on institu-
tionalized involvement mechanisms ignores non-institutionalized factors, which,
though sometimes stochastic, might play a relevant role in determining the extent
of a region’s involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process. Though it
is recognized that these non-institutional mechanisms do play a role, it is also
argued that they are difficult to measure over 304 regions. Factors which might
hinder or increase regional involvement, such as party political (in)congruence
between the centre and its regions (Bauer, 2006: 34),7 pan-European regional
networks and associations (Tatham, 2008: 508–509), the entrepreneurship of
regional representatives (Jeffery, 2000: 14–16), personal chemistries and networks
between state and regional e´lites, the role of issue saliency (Blatter et al., 2008:
467; Tatham, 2008: 503), the compatibility of policy preference constellations,
the embeddedness of regional executives in networks of private and public actors
(Fargion et al., 2006: 770–771), perceived legitimacy and social capital (Jeffery,
2000: 17), or socio-historical and cultural factors (Soldatos, 1990: 44–46), had to
be excluded. Though often relevant, their occurrence and effect over 304 regions
are either intractable or unsystematic.
Three institutionalized involvement indicators
Having cut down institutionalized regional involvement to eight dimensions and
clearly outlined the limits of such a measure, 304 individual regions were coded
using the data presented in Table 2, which summarizes the values for every system
of involvement. Table 3 displays the values of the three involvement indicators as
well as the RAI score and label for each system while descriptive statistics are
7 Nationalist/regionalist parties may also affect regional involvement and influence in significant
ways. For example, when in coalition at the national level, parties like Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU) in
Spain or the Lega Nord in Italy have been able to exert some pressure on the central government towards
greater inclusion of their (regionally defined) interests during domestic EU policy-shaping.
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Table 2. Eight indicators of institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process
Participation
right in domestic
EU policy-
shaping process
Position
on EU
affairs
Use of
Maastricht
article 203
Working
group
participation
Diplomatic
accreditation
European
Court of
Justice appeal
request
Participation in
domestic
implementation
of legislation
Financial
penalties for non-
compliance with
EU obligations Total
Austria 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0 6.5
Belgian communities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A˚land 1 0 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 3.5
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Germany 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 7.5
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 7.5
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Netherlands 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portuguese mainland
regions
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azores & Madeira 1 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 4
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6
4
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Table 2. (Continued)
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 5.5
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK DGs 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 1 6
UK ERs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: EU5European Union; UK DGs5UK devolved governments; UK ERs5UK English regions.
Sources: Kassim et al., 2000, 2001; Kovziridze, 2002; Zeller and Stussi, 2002; Alfieri, 2004; Committee of the Regions, 2005; Instituto di
Studi sui Sistemi Regionali Federali e sulle Autonomie, 2005; Gunlicks, 2005, 2007; Paraskevopoulos et al., 2006; Dimitrova and Toshkov,
2007; Jeffery, 2007a, b, 1997b; Bache, 2008; European University Institute, 2008; Moore, 2008; Raccah, 2008; Keating, 2009;
Michelmann, 2009.
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Table 3. Summary of three institutionalized regional involvement indicators and
RAI scores
Legislative and
pre-legislative
involvement
Post-
legislative
involvement
Aggregate
involvement
RAI
score Label
Austria 4.5 2 6.5 18 O¨ST
Vlaams Gewest 5 3 8 20 VlaamsG
Re´gion Wallonne and BXL
capitale
5 3 8 18 Wal.BXL
Belgian communities 5 3 8 16 BE.Com
Bulgaria 0 0 0 1 BG
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 CY
Czech Republic 0 0 0 7 CZ
Denmark 1 2 3 10 DK
Estonia 0 0 0 0 EE
Finland 1 0 1 6 FI
Kainuu 1 0 1 7 Kainuu
A˚land 2.5 1 3.5 20 A˚land
France 0 0 0 8 FR
Germany 4.5 3 7.5 21 DE
Greece 0 0 0 2 GR
Hungary 0 0 0 1 HU
Ireland 0 0 0 6 IE
Regioni a statuto ordinario 4.5 3 7.5 14 IT.Ord
Regioni a statuto speciale
& Bolzano/Trento
4.5 3 7.5 18 IT.SpTB
Latvia 0 0 0 0 LV
Lithuania 0 0 0 4 LT
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 LU
Malta 0 0 0 0 MT
The Netherlands 1.5 0 1.5 14.5 NL
Poland 0 0 0 8 PL
Portuguese mainland
regions
0 0 0 1 PT.ml
Azores & Madeira 3 1 4 15.5 Az & Ma
Romania 0 0 0 4 RO
Slovakia 0 0 0 6 SK
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 SI
Comunidades Autonomas 4 1.5 5.5 14.5 Com.Auto
Pais Vasco & Navarra 4 1.5 5.5 15.5 PaVa & Nav
Sweden 0 0 0 10 SE
Scotland 4 2 6 16.5 Scot
Wales 4 2 6 11.5 Wales
Northern Ireland 4 2 6 9.5 N.I.
English regions 0 0 0 4 Eng.Reg
Greater London Authority 0 0 0 9 London
RAI5 regional authority index.
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reported in Table 4. As this last table indicates, the average values of the three
involvement measures are rather low. The table also indicates that positive involve-
ment values are clearly a minority among EU regions as the median – and hence the
mode too – is at zero. Such a zero-inflated distribution of scores highlights that a
majority of European regions, in fact, benefit from very little institutionalized
involvement.
As is apparent from Table 3, using individual regions as the unit of analysis
allows intra-state variation on all variables. In some member states, such as Austria,
Germany, Poland, Romania, or Sweden, there is no such variation. However, other
states are asymmetrical, be it in terms of their RAI scores or of their institutiona-
lized regional involvement scores. This is obviously the case not only for the various
Belgian sub-state entities, the UK devolved governments and Greater London
Authority (GLA), some Spanish Autonomous Communities, the Italian regions and
autonomous provinces, but also the Azores and Madeira in Portugal and Kainuu
and A˚land in Finland. However, territories which belong to a member state but do
not belong to the EU, such as Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and some British,8
Dutch,9 Finnish,10 and French11 territories, have been excluded from the analysis
since they are formally not ‘EU’ regions.
The relationship between the measure of involvement at the legislative and pre-
legislative phase and that of involvement at the post-legislative phase is graphically
Table 4. Regional involvement and RAI descriptive statistics (n5 304)
Involvement at the
EU legislative and
pre-legislative phases
Involvement at
the EU post-
legislative phase
Involvement at
the pre- and post-
legislative phases RAI
Mean 1.19 0.62 1.81 8.00
SE of mean 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.36
Median 0 0 0 7
Mode 0 0 0 1.0
Std. dev. 1.83 1.11 2.90 6.26
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 5 3 8 21
EU5European Union; RAI5 regional authority index.
8 Such as Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man but also overseas territories such as Anguilla,
Bermuda, the British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Montserrat, the Pitcairn Islands, Saint Helena, South Georgia and
the South Sandwich Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands. Gibraltar, however, is part of the EU but there
are no institutionalized Gibraltar-specific involvement mechanisms.
9 Such as the isles of Antilles and Aruba.
10 Such as the Saimaa Canal and the Malyj Vysotskij Island.
11 Such as New Caledonia, the French Polynesia, Mayotte, St Pierre et Miquelon, the islands of
Saint Barthe´lemy, Saint Martin or Wallis and Futuna.
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illustrated in Figure 1. The strength of this relationship suggests that involvement at
the different phases of the policy cycle tends to be highly related.
Regional involvement and devolution
This section explores the relation between devolution and institutionalized
regional involvement and then qualitatively assesses the robustness of the purported
causal link between the two.
Linear and non-linear patterns
Figure 2 maps out the relationship between the aggregate involvement indicator
and Hooghe et al.’s measure of regional authority (RAI) and fits a regression line.
The graph indicates two things. First, it outlines that the relationship between
regional authority and regional involvement is strong and positive. Second, it
Figure 1 Relation between institutionalized regional involvement measures at the different
legislative phases.
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specifies that the RAI indicator accounts for 69% of the variance in institutionalized
regional involvement.
Figure 3 reproduces precisely the same scatterplot but this time fits a local linear
regression (LLR) smooth line so as to assess the degree of non-linearity in the
relationship between the two variables. The main finding is that a non-linear
reading of the relationship is much more instructive than a linear one. Indeed,
Figure 3 clearly indicates that there is a strong threshold effect. It appears that the
devolution and regional involvement indicators, though highly correlated overall,
hardly correlate when the devolution levels remain below a certain threshold. In
fact, until the RAI reaches a value of about 9 (i.e. London’s GLA), it has no or
very little impact on the degree of institutionalized regional involvement. How-
ever, beyond values of 9, the correlation is both very strong and positive, that is,
the more devolution, the greater the involvement. Hence, if a region has lower
levels of devolution than the GLA, as is the case for the French, Polish, Czech,
Slovakian, or Irish regions, its institutionalized involvement remains minimal.
However, once it has greater levels than the GLA, as is the case for Northern
Figure 2 Linear relation between regional authority and institutionalized regional
involvement.
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Ireland, the Danish regions, or Wales, then the relationship between devolution
and regional involvement becomes highly positive. The exceptions to this rule are
the Swedish regions, which have an RAI score of 10 but do not benefit from
specific involvement mechanisms, and the Finnish regions, which (Aland exclu-
ded) have an RAI score of 7 for Kainuu and 6 for the rest, but benefit from specific
participation rights. Interestingly, the mean value of the RAI variable is 8, hence
suggesting that when a region scores above the EU average, it is more likely to
benefit from some form of institutionalized involvement in the domestic EU
policy-shaping process.
The findings suggested by the LLR smoother line were further confirmed when
a quadratic curve function was fitted. Similar to the linear regression model, such
an equation returned estimates significant at the 0.001 level but with a higher
model fit. As is graphically represented in Figure 4, the fit went from 69% of
variance explained through the linear model, to 78% through the quadratic
Figure 3 Non-linear relation between regional authority and institutionalized regional
involvement.
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model. The improvement in model fit confirms that the relationship between
devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is more fruitfully under-
stood as non-linear and that a quadratic conceptualization of their association
better describes the data at hand for the EU’s 304 regions.
Contrary to expectations, the exponential and logistic readings of the relationship
reaped a lower model fit: about 62% of variance captured for the former and
Figure 4 Quadratic curve estimation and linear regression line of the relation between
regional authority and institutionalized regional involvement.
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65% for the latter.12 Although a cubic polynomial achieves a superior model fit than
its quadratic equivalent, the difference is only of about three percentage points.
Crucially, a cubic function makes little theoretical sense as it predicts a drop
in institutionalized involvement at high RAI values. Hence, though it fits the data
marginally better, the cubic understanding of the relationship between devolution
and regional involvement is non-sensical – and therefore rejected. These findings are
graphically represented in Figure 5 and summarized in Table 5.
Assessing causality
I have argued above that the relationship between devolution and institutionalized
regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process is not strictly linear
Figure 5 Quadratic, cubic, exponential, and logistic relations between regional authority
and institutionalized regional involvement.
12 As it is not possible to fit an exponential or a logistic model to non-positive values, all 0 values were
replaced by 1E-007 values so as to run the exponential and logistic equations.
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but has a threshold effect below which the relationship is quasi-non-existent and
above which it is strongly positive, as the quadratic function suggests. Below, I argue
that this relationship is causal.
Establishing causation is no mean task and implies the fulfilment of three
conditions at the very least. The first is that there should be temporal precedence
(X before Y). The second is that there should be covariation (if X then Y, with a
positive or a negative correlation). The third is that alternative causes should be
eliminated (if no X then no Y even in the presence of Z), that is, that the relationship
should not be spurious, driven by a third variable.
Temporal precedence and covariation. Ascertaining temporal precedence is a
matter of process tracing. As the number of cases here is rather limited (as outlined
in Table 3, the 304 cases belong to 38 distinct systems), this is no insurmountable
task. A simple survey of each system indicates that, each time, greater involvement
has followed devolution of powers. Put another way, there are no cases of greater
involvement preceding initial devolution. Concerning (quasi) devolution-invariant
systems, where devolution levels have remained relatively stable, regional invol-
vement has tended to increase over time as a consequence of deepening European
integration or of EU accession. The German case is a fine example of the former
trend (Gunlicks, 2005, 2007; Jeffery, 2007b; Hrbek, 2009) while Austria illustrates
the latter (Morass, 1997; Kovziridze, 2002; Kiefer, 2009). In most devolution-
variant systems, however, involvement has increased with devolution levels, albeit
with a (differential) time lag. This lag was almost non-existent concerning the UK
devolved governments, where adjustment between the devolution and involvement
levels was immediate (Bulmer et al., 2002; Tatham, 2007b). In other cases, such as
those of the Italian regions or the Spanish Autonomous Communities, the lag was
greater, most probably because the European integration process was still largely
underway at the time of devolution, and hence the pressure for matching devolution
levels with involvement levels was initially weaker, but strengthened over time as
integration deepened (Mabellini, 2005b; Fargion et al., 2006: 764; Aldecoa and
Cornago, 2009).
Table 5. Model summaries and parameter estimates of the relationship between
institutionalized regional involvement (Y) and regional authority (X)
Model summary Parameter estimates
Equation R2 F d.f.1 d.f.2 Significance Constant b1 b2 b3
Linear 0.69 677.68 1 302 0.000 21.26 0.39 – –
Quadratic 0.78 522.57 2 301 0.000 20.18 20.04 0.02 –
Cubic 0.81 428.51 3 300 0.000 0.41 20.59 0.10 0.00
Exponential 0.62 489.19 1 302 0.000 1.18E-008 1.06 – –
Logistic 0.65 550.67 1 302 0.000 132729148.16 0.31 – –
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The second condition, covariance, is easier to test. Simple correlation indicates a
high level of covariance between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement.
Indeed, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.83 and is significant at the 0.001 level
(two-tailed).13
Rival explanations. The third condition is the elimination of rival causes of
variation on the involvement measure. This is usually the most difficult step in
substantiating a causal claim as it entails testing for other determinants to check
that the initial relationship between X and Y is not spurious and is either acci-
dental or caused, for example, by omitted variable Z. As the traditional example
goes, despite being temporally precedent and correlating strongly, Robins and
birthday cards cause neither Spring nor birthdays. Indeed, if one were to repel all
Robins and dismantle all mailboxes, Spring and birthdays would still come.
Establishing causation between devolution, on the one hand, and institutionalized
involvement by central government of regions on EU affairs, on the other, requires
asking the counterfactual question: if there were no devolution, would there be
institutionalized regional involvement?
The best test for such a counterfactual question is to have a look at most similar
systems using Mill’s Method of Difference (Lijphart, 1971: 688–689) so as to
further explore whether variation on the devolution variable causes variation on
the involvement variable. This can be done in two ways: either by comparing the
same case over time or by synchronically comparing an asymmetrical system.
Comparison of a case over a long period of time, however, weakens the ceteris
paribus assumption as other factors – especially the depth of European integration –
do not remain constant. Typically, these cases include Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Poland, or France, with the latter two, however, still having too low a level of
devolution at the regional level to impact on the involvement variable. These cases
do give an idea of the trend, which has been that when devolution levels remain
low, institutionalized involvement remains quasi non-existent and that when
devolution levels increase over time, institutionalized involvement also increases
over time. The second way is probably a more powerful test of non-spuriousness
and consists of a comparison of regions in an asymmetrical political system. The
UK devolved governments, the islands of A˚land (Finland), Madeira and the
Azores (Portugal) illustrate that within the same political system, where the
devolution and involvement levels are strikingly different between regions, they
still correlate highly. Indeed, the Province of A˚land has higher levels of devolution
than the other Finnish regions and hence higher involvement values. Ditto for
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Madeira and Azores islands. Extreme
cases such as Greenland or the Faroe Islands (both excluded from the data set) all
have high enough levels of devolution that they have even been allowed by their
13 Non-parametric measures, such as Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, also return highly
positive and significant estimates.
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member state to opt out of the EU altogether, and hence partly regain control over
what would otherwise equate to EU affairs.14
The argument that the relationship might be spurious because driven by an
omitted variable such as cultural or historical distinctiveness (which would account
for variations on both the devolution and involvement variables) is interesting but
can be rejected by having a look at cases with strong and weak historical/cultural
heritage and seeing how these values correlate (or not) with the devolution and
involvement levels. If one considers territories, such as Savoy, Corsica, Brittany,
Normandy, the French Basques, Cornwall, Friesland, Silesia, Bohemia, or the
Finlandssvensk (the Swedish-speaking Finns), then it appears that cultural distinc-
tiveness and historical heritage certainly do not cause devolution or institutionalized
involvement. Many symmetric unitary states do comprise historically and culturally
singular territories, which, in spite of their specificities, do not benefit from special
institutional arrangements. Reciprocally, many non-historical and non-cultural
regions benefit from high levels of devolution and involvement, as some non-
historical Autonomous Communities (cf. cafe´ para todos) or linguistically composite
Italian regions show (e.g. Lazio or Puglia). Meanwhile, relatively demos-
homogeneous countries such as Germany or Austria have adopted highly federal
systems (Kramer, 2005: 144; Erk, 2008: 17–18, 57, 72; Kiefer, 2009: 67). Indeed, in
some federations, the constituent units represent distinct historical or cultural
communities, while in others they are merely functional territories (Karmis and
Norman, 2005; Keating, 2009: 430). This does not mean that cultural distinctive-
ness or historical heritage does not play a role. They do. However, their impact
is neither unidirectional nor strong enough to codetermine the devolution and
involvement levels and hence make their correlation spurious.
Consequently, the mismatch between the cultural/historical distinctiveness of a
territory and its institutional empowerment and hence the lack of a deterministic
link between identity/culture on the one hand, and territorial devolution of power
on the other (Guibernau, 1999: 33–66; Keating et al., 2003: 20–27; Smith and
Wistrich, 2007; Keating, 2009: 424–431) strongly suggests that such a variable does
not play a decisive role in jointly determining the levels of devolution and institu-
tionalized involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process. Undeniably, as
Marks et al. have previously concluded,
the causes of regionalisation are diverse. (y) Regionalisation has taken place
in small countries and large countries (y), ethnically diverse societies and
ethnically homogenous societies, countries that were centralised in 1950 and
countries that were regionalised in 1950, established democracies and new
14 Such cases might give credence to the cubic understanding of the relationship between devolution
and institutionalized regional involvement, as Greenland and the Faroe Islands have high devolution
values but have opted out of the EU, and hence are only involved in the domestic EU policy-shaping
process through their parliamentary representation (Folketing). However, as these cases do not belong to
the EU, they are consequently outside of the population of EU regions and excluded from the analysis.
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democracies. (y) It is worth noting (y) that regionalisation has taken place,
to some degree, in all but a few countries not shielded by their tiny population
size or by the fact that they were already highly regionalised (Marks et al.,
2008: 169).
On the basis of the method of difference, as applied both longitudinally to single
cases which vary on the devolution variable over time and synchronically to different
regions which vary on the devolution variable within the same member state, one can
argue that the causal link suggested by the temporal precedence and high covariance
between devolution and institutionalized involvement seems fairly robust.
Conclusion
Devolution has been at the heart of much research focusing on the interaction
between the EU and its regions. It has been perceived as both a driver and enabler
of territorial mobilization at the EU level and has led some research to presume that
it not only increases the level of regional activity and influence in Brussels, but
also its independence from central governments. Moreover, as devolution was
positively correlated with conflict in domestic intergovernmental relations, it was
also assumed that it would lead to greater conflict on the European scene. Though
popular in much MLG research, these two assumptions (greater independence in
Brussels and greater conflict on the European scene) have been questioned by recent
research which has stressed that higher devolution levels are in fact associated with
less bypassing and greater cooperation between the state and its regions in their
European activities (Jeffery, 2007a; Tatham, 2007a, 2010). Though somewhat
counter-intuitive at first, these findings simply suggest that greater devolution causes
greater regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process.
Such a relationship between devolution, on the one hand, and regional involve-
ment in the domestic EU policy-shaping process, on the other, had never been
systematically investigated in the EU-27. To fill this research gap, this paper has
proposed a measure of institutionalized regional involvement and analysed its
relationship to Hooghe et al.’s RAI. I argue that such a relationship is overall
strongly positive but also non-linear. A comparison of linear and non-linear
models reveals that a quadratic conceptualization of the relationship between
devolution and regional involvement is more accurate. The quadratic model
indicates that below a certain level of devolution the relationship is inexistent and
beyond such a level it is overwhelming. Qualitative assessment of the causal link
shows that there are good grounds to accept the hypothesis that, beyond a certain
threshold situated above the population mean, greater devolution leads to greater
institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process.
This study therefore sheds some light on the apparently incompatible findings of
research on domestic intergovernmental relations and research on state-region
interaction in Brussels. Indeed, while greater devolution has tended to increase the
amount of conflict in domestic intergovernmental relations, it has not led to the
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expected increase in conflict in Brussels. To the contrary, greater devolution has
caused greater coordination and cooperation at the EU level (Jeffery, 2007a; Tatham,
2010). The overall positive, though non-linear, relationship between devolution and
institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process
explains this otherwise counter-intuitive finding. Process and outcome should
therefore not be confused: though the process (of domestic intergovernmental rela-
tions) might be conflict-ridden, the outcome at the EU level will be more coordinated
and cooperative than when devolution levels remain critically low.
Finally, this research highlights the salience and influence of regional players
in the EU policy cycle and argues that the recognition of their role and power is not
only compatible with the LI analytical framework but, in fact, an intrinsic – though
neglected – part of it. Indeed, regions represent important domestic players in a
growing number of member states and hence codetermine national preferences
along with other non-state players such as a variety of (generally economic) interest
groups and stakeholders. The growing number of regions in the EU, as well as their
gradual empowerment over the last three decades, all point to the necessity of
explicitly factoring regions into the right-hand side of the ‘national preference for-
mation’ equation. Many European regions are deeply and formally involved in their
member state’s domestic EU policy-shaping process, from the pre-legislative phase to
the post-legislative phase. Ignoring the power of regional governments in Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom is clearly non-sensical.
Continuing to overlook regions when analysing EU politics not only hampers the
predictive capacity of LI but is also contrary to its theoretical foundations. The self-
professed openness of LI ‘to dialogue and synthesis with other theories’ (Moravcsik
and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 67) should encourage its users to carefully rethink the
impact of devolution and the subsequent role of regions in the EU policy process. In
this sense, a bridge between LI and MLG can be fruitfully built.
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